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______________ 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 This matter comes on before this Court on appeal from 
the District Court’s March 18, 2011 order implementing a 
comprehensive opinion granting motions that certain defendants, 
now the appellees in this appeal, brought seeking summary 
judgment.  See Lomando v. United States, No. 08-4177, 2011 
WL 1042900 (D.N.J. Mar. 18, 2011).  Appellant Ines Lomando 
(“Lomando”), as administratix ad prosequendum of the estate of 
her daughter, Laura Lomando (“Laura”), brought this medical 
malpractice and wrongful death action against parties involved 
in Laura’s health care that culminated in her death on September 
21, 2006.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm in part, 
reverse in part, and remand the case to the District Court for 
further proceedings with respect to one defendant.  
 
II. FACTUAL and PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On August 23, August 28, September 9, and September 
11, 2006, Laura sought and received treatment at the Parker 
Family Health Center (“Parker Health”), a free New Jersey non-
profit health clinic, for an area of swelling on the left side of her 
neck.  Three volunteer physicians at Parker Health, Drs. Zaven 
Ayanian, Lynn Helmer, and Timothy Sullivan, none of whom 
has been a party in this case, cared for Laura during these visits. 
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 Effective in January 2006, and during all periods that Laura 
received treatment from Parker Health, the United States 
Department of Health and Human Services deemed those 
physicians to be Public Health Service (“PHS”) employees 
pursuant to a provision of the Public Health Service Act 
(“PHSA”), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 233(o).  By virtue of that 
designation, the physicians fell within the scope of the Federal 
Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-2680, 
which precluded a suit against them individually for their 
services at Parker Health and substituted a suit against the 
United States as the exclusive remedy for their alleged 
malpractice.   
 In September 2006, Laura also sought treatment for her 
swollen neck and other symptoms at the Riverview Medical 
Center’s Emergency Room Department, a facility where the 
physicians did not enjoy the PHSA and FTCA protections from 
litigation shielding the Parker Health physicians.  Specifically, 
Laura visited Riverview on September 3, 5, 15, and 20, 2006, 
where Ms. Theresa Biedenbach, a physician assistant, and Drs. 
Stephanie Reynolds, Trevor Talbert, and David Hyppolite 
evaluated her.  Laura’s September 20 visit to Riverview would 
be her last, for the next day she died of spontaneous tumor lysis 
syndrome caused by an underlying condition of non-Hodgkins 
lymphoma.   
Lomando filed suit under the FTCA and New Jersey law 
in the District Court on August 20, 2008, and filed an amended 
complaint on September 30, 2008.1
                                                 
1Initially, Lomando filed suit in the New Jersey Superior Court, 
  She named the following 
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defendants in the action: the United States, Parker Health, 
Riverview Medical Center, Drs. Reynolds, Talbert, and 
Hyppolite, and Emergency Physician Associates of North Jersey, 
P.C. (“Emergency Physician Associates”), the employer of the 
three individual defendants and Ms. Biedenbach.  Lomando, 
however, did not include Ms. Biedenbach as a defendant, an 
omission that, as we shall see, had significant consequences in 
this litigation.   
On February 23, 2011, the District Court granted Parker 
Health’s unopposed motion for summary judgment predicated 
on its claim of immunity under the New Jersey Charitable 
Immunity Act, which we discuss at length below.  Inasmuch as 
Lomando is not challenging this disposition Parker Health is not 
participating in this appeal.  On March 18, 2011, the District 
Court granted summary judgment to all remaining defendants 
except Dr. Hyppolite who did not seek summary judgment, but 
in the exercise of its discretion the Court declined to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over the claims against him and 
therefore the action was terminated in the District Court.2
The District Court had different reasons for granting the 
contested motions for summary judgment to different 
defendants.  The Court granted summary judgment to Riverview 
   
                                                                                                             
but that court dismissed the case without prejudice on October 
31, 2008.  
 
2Lomando since has filed suit in the New Jersey Superior Court 
against Dr. Hyppolite. 
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Medical Center because Lomando failed to provide expert 
testimony against Riverview as required to establish a prima 
facie case of liability for medical malpractice under New Jersey 
law.  We, however, are not concerned with this disposition as 
Lomando does not challenge it on this appeal.  Thus, Riverview, 
like Parker Health, is not participating in this appeal.   
The District Court addressed two distinct but related 
questions in dealing with Lomando’s FTCA claim against the 
United States.  The United States contended that because a 
provision of the FTCA, 28 U.S.C. § 2674, provides that the 
United States “shall be entitled to assert any defense based upon 
judicial or legislative immunity which otherwise would have 
been available to the employee of the United States whose act or 
omission gave rise to the claim,” the United States was entitled 
to claim any immunity available to the volunteer physicians of 
Parker Health.  In support of this claim of immunity, the United 
States invoked the Volunteer Protection Act of 1997 (“VPA”), 
42 U.S.C. § 14503(a), which immunizes volunteers of nonprofit 
organizations and governmental entities from claims alleging 
negligence based on acts committed within the scope of such 
volunteerism, and the New Jersey Charitable Immunity Act 
(“NJCIA”), N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-7 (West 2011), which 
immunizes charitable nonprofit entities and their volunteers 
from liability for negligence in similar circumstances.  Lomando 
countered that 28 U.S.C. § 2674 did not permit the United States 
to rely on immunities available to the volunteer physicians at 
Parker Health because under the FTCA “the [U]nited States 
stands in the shoes of the nonprofit health center and may assert 
only those immunities available to such centers under federal 
and state law.”  Lomando, 2011 WL 1042900, at *5.   
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The parties’ contentions thus raised the independent but 
intertwined questions of: first, whether under the FTCA the 
United States assumes the role of a similarly-placed private 
employer or stands in the shoes of the immunized employee, 
and, second, whether under the FTCA the United States can 
assert its employees’ immunities and defenses.  The District 
Court dealt with these questions first by citing variant case law 
that illustrated that the United States has been equated to both a 
private employer and an immunized employee in FTCA cases.  
Shifting its analysis, the Court then examined section 2674, and 
stated that the text “strongly suggests that it permits the United 
States to assert immunities available to its employees.”  Id. at 
*6.  Ultimately, however, the Court did not rule on either issue, 
but, instead, held that under the NJCIA both Parker Health, as a 
nonprofit health center, and Drs. Ayanian, Helmer, and Sullivan, 
as volunteer physicians at Parker Health, are immune from suit.3 
 Accordingly, the Court concluded that pursuant to section 2674 
the United States is entitled to the immunity from suit that the 
NJCIA granted, regardless of whether it derived that immunity 
from the immunity of Parker Health or the individual 
physicians.4
                                                 
3As we have indicated, Parker Health predicated its uncontested 
successful motion for summary judgment on its claim to 
immunity under the NJCIA.  Lomando does not challenge that 
disposition on this appeal.    
 
 
4A firm decision on the issue of whether the United States is 
entitled to assert its deemed employees’ defenses under 28 
U.S.C. § 2674 would have been necessary if the Court had 
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The District Court held that Drs. Reynolds and Talbert, 
physicians who evaluated Laura at Riverview, were entitled to 
summary judgment because Lomando’s experts’ qualifications 
failed to meet the requirements of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-41 
(West 2011) with respect to witnesses in medical malpractice 
actions.  That statute ordinarily requires that in cases alleging 
medical malpractice by a health practitioner in a medically-
recognized specialty where the care at issue involved that 
specialty, a plaintiff must offer expert testimony from a 
practitioner in that same specialty.  In this regard, the Court held 
that because Drs. Reynolds and Talbert are board-certified 
specialists in emergency medicine, a specialty that the American 
Board of Medical Specialties recognizes, and Laura’s care 
involved emergency medicine, Lomando was required to 
produce expert testimony from specialists in emergency 
medicine.  Thus, statements that Lomando’s experts, Drs. Mark 
Fialk and James Hayes, neither of whom is an emergency 
medicine specialist, submitted were insufficient to satisfy N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-41.    
Finally, the Court concluded that Emergency Physician 
Associates was entitled to summary judgment because Lomando 
had not produced any expert statements alleging that it had 
deviated from the applicable standard of care, apart from the 
testimony against Drs. Reynolds and Talbert that the Court had 
                                                                                                             
predicated the United States’ immunity on the VPA, because 
that act differs from the NJCIA in that it grants immunity only to 
volunteers of nonprofit organizations and not to the 
organizations themselves.  42 U.S.C. § 14503(a).  
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rejected.5
 Lomando asserts that the District Court erred in holding 
that the United States is immune from suit under the NJCIA, as 
she contends that: (1) the physicians at Parker Health were not 
“volunteers” for purposes of the NJCIA because they were 
“employees” of the Public Health Service and (2) the decision 
permitting the United States to avail itself of the NJCIA 
immunity conflicted with the scheme that the FTCA envisioned 
and thus created a conflict between state and federal law.  
Lomando also argues that the Court erred in its conclusion that 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-41 applies to the present case, and 
contends that Drs. Reynolds and Talbert provided care that did 
not involve the practice of emergency medicine.  Alternatively, 
Lomando asserts that even if that statute applies, Dr. Fialk’s 
qualifications were sufficient for him to give expert testimony in 
this case.  Finally, Lomando challenges the Court’s decision not 
to consider treatment that Ms. Biedenbach provided to Laura in 
  In granting Emergency Physician Associates 
summary judgment, the Court declined to consider statements 
that Lomando’s experts submitted alleging deviations from the 
applicable standard of care by Emergency Physician Associates’ 
employee, Ms. Biedenbach, because Lomando “ha[d] not named 
[Ms. Biedenbach] as a defendant.”  Lomando, 2011 WL 
1042900, at *10 n.10.   
                                                 
5Because Lomando had not made specific allegations against 
Emergency Physician Associates apart from those predicated on 
the treatment by the individual practitioners that it employed, the 
Court “treat[ed] all arguments applicable to the doctors as 
equally applicable to the group.”  Lomando, 2011 WL 1042900, 
at *10 n.10.   
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support of Lomando’s claims against Emergency Physician 
Associates.  
 
III. JURISDICTION and STANDARD of REVIEW 
 The District Court had jurisdiction over Lomando’s 
FTCA claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), and over her 
state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).  We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
We exercise plenary review over the order granting 
appellees summary judgment, applying the same standard that 
the District Court applied.  See Knopick v. Connelly, 639 F.3d 
600, 606 (3d Cir. 2011); Azur v. Chase Bank, USA, Nat’l Ass’n, 
601 F.3d 212, 216 (3d Cir. 2010).  In this plenary review, we 
can affirm the summary judgment only if “there [wa]s no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and the [prevailing 
defendants were] entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Melrose, Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, 613 
F.3d 380, 387 (3d Cir. 2010).  A genuine dispute is one that 
“may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.”  Anderson 
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511 
(1986).  A material fact is one “that might affect the outcome of 
the suit under the governing law.”  Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. 
 We must view the record in the light most favorable to 
Lomando as the non-moving party, and we must draw all 
reasonable inferences that the record supports in her favor.  See 
Kaucher v. Cnty. of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006).  
To the extent that the District Court’s opinion contains 
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conclusions of law, our review is de novo.  See Azur, 601 F.3d 
at 216.   
 
IV.  DISCUSSION and ANALYSIS 
(1) Whether the District Court erred as a matter of law in 
determining that the United States is immune from suit 
under the NJCIA, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-7(a), and 28 
U.S.C. § 2674? 
(a) The Role of the United States under the FTCA and 42 
U.S.C. § 233(o) 
Under 42 U.S.C. § 254b(c)(1)(A), the government “may 
make grants to public and nonprofit private entities for projects 
to plan and develop health centers which will serve medically 
underserved populations.”  As the court described in Wilson v. 
Big Sandy Health Care, Inc., 576 F.3d 329, 333 (6th Cir. 2009), 
“[i]n part due to the relatively high cost of obtaining malpractice 
insurance for treatment of . . . high-risk patients . . . the efforts to 
provide necessary medical care in . . . underserved areas initially 
faced significant roadblocks.”  In response, Congress passed the 
Federally Supported Health Centers Assistance Act of 1992 
(“1992 Act”), Pub. L. No. 102-501, 106 Stat. 3268 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 201, 233).   
The 1992 Act created a process by which “public and 
nonprofit private entities” receiving federal funds pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. § 254b(c)(1)(A) and health practitioners that such entities 
employ “shall be deemed to be [employees] of the Public Health 
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Service.”  42 U.S.C. § 233(g)(1)(A).  This treatment of health 
care centers receiving section 254b funding and practitioners at 
them is highly significant, for an action against the United States 
under the FTCA is the exclusive remedy for persons alleging 
“personal injury, including death, resulting from the 
performance of medical . . . or related functions” by Public 
Health Service employees acting within the scope of their 
employment.  42 U.S.C. § 233(a); see also 42 U.S.C. § 
233(g)(1)(A) (reiterating subsection 233(a)’s exclusivity clause). 
  
In 1996 in an effort to “expand access to health care 
services to low-income individuals in medically underserved 
areas,” H.R. Rep. No. 104-736, at 234 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), 
reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1990, 2091, Congress conferred 
the same deemed “employee” status and attendant FTCA 
coverage on a second and distinct category of persons: health 
practitioners who volunteer at free clinics.  See Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”), Pub. L. 
No. 104-191, § 194, 110 Stat. 1936, 1988-91 (1996) (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 233(o)).  Congress did not condition the 
award of this immunity on the government making grants to the 
clinics.  Under the HIPAA, volunteer health practitioners who at 
free clinics provide a “qualifying health service” “shall in 
providing services for the free clinic, be deemed to be 
[employees] of the Public Health Service.”  42 U.S.C. § 
233(o)(1).6
                                                 
6Unlike a health care center receiving section 254b funding 
which may be deemed an employee of the PHS under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 233(g), a free clinic is not deemed an employee of the PHS 
  The HIPAA likewise made explicit that an FTCA 
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action against the United States is the sole remedy through 
which medical malpractice and similar claims may be brought 
on account of the services of such volunteers.  See 42 U.S.C. § 
233(o)(5).  In this case, the physicians who treated Laura at 
Parker Health were deemed employees of the Public Health 
Service pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 233(o) because Parker Health is 
a free clinic and the physicians there provided their services as 
volunteers.7
Subject to exceptions not at issue in this case, the FTCA 
waives the sovereign immunity of the United States in its district 
courts for tort claims “caused by the negligent or wrongful act or 
  See app. at 215 (Letter from Department of Health 
and Human Services to Volunteers in Health (Jan. 27, 2006) 
(deeming Parker Health physicians employees of PHS pursuant 
to 42 U.S.C. § 233(o))). 
                                                                                                             
and thus the FTCA did not preclude Lomando’s suit against 
Parker Health.  See 42 U.S.C. § 233(o)(5)(B) (The subsection 
extending FTCA coverage to volunteers at free clinics “may not 
be construed as deeming any free clinic to be an employee of the 
Public Health Service.”).   
 
742 U.S.C. § 233(o) specifies the criteria for an entity to be 
regarded as a “free clinic,” what conditions must be met in order 
for a health care practitioner to be considered a “free clinic 
health professional,” and what constitutes a “qualifying health 
service.”  See 42 U.S.C. § 233(o)(2)-(o)(4).  Because the parties 
do not dispute that Parker Health is a free clinic, and that the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services deemed the volunteer 
physicians who treated Laura at Parker Health to be federal 
employees, we do not set forth those provisions.   
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omission of any employee of the Government while acting 
within the scope of his office or employment, under 
circumstances [in which] the United States, if a private person, 
would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the 
place where the act or omission occurred.”  28 U.S.C. § 
1346(b)(1).  Section 1346 contains two basic principles that 
govern FTCA claims.   
First, “the FTCA does not itself create a substantive 
cause of action against the United States; rather, it provides a 
mechanism for bringing a state law tort action against the 
federal government in federal court.”  In re Orthopedic Bone 
Screw Prod. Liab. Litig., 264 F.3d 344, 362 (3d Cir. 2001); see 
also CNA v. United States, 535 F.3d 132, 141 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(“The cause of action in an FTCA claim . . . must come from 
state tort law.”).  Accordingly, “the extent of the United States’ 
liability under the FTCA is generally determined by reference to 
state law.”  In re Orthopedic, 264 F.3d at 362 (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted); see also Santos ex rel. Beato v. 
United States, 559 F.3d 189, 193 (3d Cir. 2009) (noting that 
“substantively the FTCA follows state liability law”).  The 
parties agree that because Laura’s treatment and death were in 
New Jersey, the law of that state is applicable here.   
Second, the United States is liable only to the extent that 
in the same circumstances the applicable local law would hold 
“a private person” responsible.  28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1).  
Congress reiterated that precept in 28 U.S.C. § 2674, which 
provides that the United States is answerable under the FTCA 
“in the same manner and to the same extent as a private 
individual under like circumstances.”  See also United States v. 
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Olson, 546 U.S. 43, 46, 126 S.Ct. 510, 512 (2005) (“Our cases 
have consistently adhered to this ‘private person’ standard.”).  
The FTCA’s provision that the United States shall be liable to 
the same extent as “a private person” or “private individual” 
does not specify whether the United States is liable to the extent 
that a similarly-placed private employer would be liable or to the 
extent its employee if not an employee of the federal 
government would be liable.  Seemingly, this omission has 
engendered the variant case law that the District Court cited. 
 We addressed this distinction between employer and 
employee in McSwain v. United States, 422 F.2d 1086, 1087-88 
(3d Cir. 1970), in which we clarified that the United States 
occupies the role of a similarly-placed private employer under 
the FTCA:  
Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2674, the United States is 
liable for injury caused by the negligent act of a 
government employee to the same extent a private 
employer would be liable.  Such liability for the 
acts or omissions of a civilian or military federal 
employee is determined by the law of respondeat 
superior of the state in which the act or omission 
occurred. 
(citing Williams v. United States, 350 U.S. 857, 76 S.Ct. 100 
(1955)); see also Matsko v. United States, 372 F.3d 556, 561 (3d 
Cir. 2004) (distinguishing plaintiff’s claim that United States 
failed to protect him from an intentional tort by a government 
employee from traditional FTCA “respondeat superior claim 
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for” the government employee’s actions).8
                                                 
8Most courts of appeals have determined consistently with this 
view that the FTCA imposes liability on the United States to the 
extent that a private employer would be liable in similar 
circumstances in the pertinent locality.  See Haceesa v. United 
States, 309 F.3d 722, 729 (10th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he 
Government’s liability under the FTCA is limited to that of a 
private employer under like circumstances.”); Day v. 
Massachusetts Air Nat’l Guard, 167 F.3d 678, 681 (1st Cir. 
1999) (The United States has consented to be sued under the 
FTCA “provided that in the same circumstances a private 
employer would be liable for the acts of his employee under the 
local law.”); Taber v. Maine, 67 F.3d 1029, 1048 (2d Cir. 1995) 
(“Pursuant to the FTCA, courts merely determine whether 
analogous behavior by a private-sector employee would give 
rise to some form of fault-based vicarious liability on the part of 
a private-sector employer.”); Johnson v. Sawyer, 47 F.3d 716, 
730 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (“All FTCA liability is respondeat 
superior liability. . . .  Under the FTCA, the United States is not 
liable if the private employer would not be liable pursuant to 
local law.”).  But courts do not always follow this approach for 
in Knowles v. United States, 91 F.3d 1147, 1150 (8th Cir. 1996), 
the court held that the United States is liable to the extent the 
immunized employee would be liable under local law.  But see 
St. John v. United States, 240 F.3d 671, 676 (8th Cir. 2001) 
(“The FTCA is a limited waiver of sovereign immunity, 
allowing the federal government to be sued for the actions of 
‘any employee of the Government while acting within the scope 
of his office or employment’ under circumstances where the 
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The Supreme Court likewise has described the United 
States’ role under the FTCA as equivalent to that of an employer 
answering under respondeat superior liability.  In Gutierrez de 
Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 427, 115 S.Ct. 2227, 2232 
(1995), the Court observed that where the United States certifies 
in response to an FTCA claim that an employee was acting 
within the scope of his employment with respect to his actions 
concerning the claim, “the United States, by certifying, is . . . 
exposing itself to liability as would any other employer at 
common law who admits that an employee acted within the 
scope of his employment.”  (citing Restatement (Second) of 
Agency § 219 (1958)) (emphasis added); Lamagno, 515 U.S. at 
420, 115 S.Ct. at 2229 (“Generally, [FTCA] cases unfold much 
as cases do against other employers who concede respondeat 
superior liability.”); see also Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797, 801, 
92 S.Ct. 1899, 1901-02 (1972) (“Congress intended to permit 
liability essentially based on the intentionally wrongful or 
careless conduct of Government employees, for which the 
Government was to be made liable according to state law under 
the doctrine of respondeat superior . . . .”). 
Looking to the text of the FTCA, we note that the act 
shadows precisely the common law of respondeat superior 
liability, providing that the United States is subject to suit for the 
negligent acts of “any employee of the Government while acting 
within the scope of his office or employment.”  28 U.S.C. § 
1346(b)(1) (emphasis added); see 1 S. Speiser, C. Krause, & A. 
Gans, The American Law of Torts § 4.3, pp. 581-82 (2003) 
(“[I]t is hornbook law that the doctrine of respondeat superior 
                                                                                                             
United States would be liable if it were a private employer.”). 
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renders an employer or master vicariously liable for a tort 
committed by his employee or servant while acting within the 
scope of employment.”); Restatement (Third) of Agency § 2.04 
(“An employer is subject to liability for torts committed by 
employees acting within the scope of their employment.”).  
Thus, the plain language of the FTCA, which treats the United 
States as liable for the tortious actions of its employees, creates 
a remedial scheme under which the United States would be 
liable as an employer in like circumstances.  See also 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2671 note (“The United States, through the Federal Tort 
Claims Act, is responsible to injured persons for the common 
law torts of its employees in the same manner in which the 
common law historically has recognized the responsibility of an 
employer for torts committed by its employees within the scope 
of their employment.”) (emphasis added).   
In sum, the FTCA provides that the United States will be 
liable to the extent that a private employer would be liable in 
similar circumstances in the same locality.  In this case, then, the 
United States stands in the shoes that a similarly-placed private 
employer of the physicians, i.e., a free non-profit health center, 
would stand and answers for the allegedly tortious conduct of 
the United States’ deemed employees, the volunteer physicians 
at that health center.9
                                                 
9This case appears to be the first precedential opinion to address 
squarely the interaction of 42 U.S.C. § 233(o) and the FTCA.  
The District Court stated that Knowles v. United States, 29 F.3d 
1261 (8th Cir. 1994), stands for the proposition that the United 
States “stands in the shoes of both health institutions and 
physicians” in cases such as this one.  Lomando, 2011 WL 
  We turn now to the question of what 
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defenses the United States may invoke in that position.   
(b) The Defenses of the United States under the FTCA 
In 1988, Congress clarified the terms of the United 
States’ waiver of sovereign immunity under the FTCA through 
the Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation 
                                                                                                             
1042900, at *5 n.6 (citing Knowles, 29 F.3d at 1265 (“In this 
case, the United States is standing in the shoes of a hospital, a 
doctor, two nurses, and the [Medical Service Specialists].”)).  
We think, however, that Knowles is of limited precedential 
value here as it did not deal with private physicians who were 
“deemed” federal employees under 42 U.S.C. § 233(o), but 
rather involved a suit against a military base hospital and its 
employees.   See 29 F.3d at 1262-63.  Though there is a dearth 
of guidance on the issue of how to characterize a similarly-
placed private employer of a volunteer physician deemed an 
employee of the PHS under 42 U.S.C. § 233(o), it seems that 
equating the United States to a free clinic, rather than a hospital 
or practice group that employs the physicians for compensation, 
is the only way to ensure that the United States’ liability under 
the FTCA is the same as that of a “private person” in similar 
circumstances.  If the United States is treated as a paying 
employer, the entire statutory predicate of this case, that the 
physicians were deemed employees precisely because they were 
volunteers at a free clinic, must be ignored, and, further, the 
United States’ liability would be expanded beyond that of a 
similarly-placed entity, simply by virtue of application of the 
FTCA.  
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Act of 1988 (“Westfall Act”), Pub. L. No. 100-694, 102 Stat. 
4563 (codified as amended at scattered portions of the United 
States Code).  The Westfall Act provided for absolute immunity 
to federal employees in the wake of Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 
292, 108 S.Ct. 580 (1988), by making suit against the United 
States under the FTCA the exclusive remedy for negligent or 
wrongful acts by federal employees committed within the scope 
of employment.10
With respect to any claim under [the FTCA], the 
United States shall be entitled to assert any 
defense based upon judicial or legislative 
immunity which otherwise would have been 
available to the employee of the United States 
whose act or omission gave rise to the claim, as 
well as any other defenses to which the United 
States is entitled.   
  As significant to this case, the Westfall Act 
also added the following provision to the FTCA:   
28 U.S.C. § 2674.  The text of section 2674 is straightforward, 
and its import clear.  See United States v. Gregg, 226 F.3d 253, 
257 (3d Cir. 2000) (“If the language of the statute expresses 
Congress’s intent with sufficient precision, the inquiry ends 
                                                 
10In Westfall, the Court held that government employees were 
absolutely immune only from suits based on acts that were both 
within the scope of employment and discretionary in nature.  
484 U.S. at 300, 108 S.Ct. at 585.  The Westfall Act eliminated 
the requirement that for the employee to have immunity the 
allegedly wrongful acts must have involved the exercise of 
discretion.   
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there and the statute is enforced according to its terms.”).  The 
United States as the employer may assert any defense rooted in 
judicial or legislative immunity which would have been 
available to its employee had he not been a deemed employee of 
the PHS and, instead, had been a defendant in the action at hand. 
 In this case, section 2674 thus allows the United States to avail 
itself of any judicially- or legislatively-based immunity to which 
the individual physicians — its employees for purposes of the 
FTCA — would have been entitled if they were the defendants.  
This provision for immunity is superimposed on Congress’s 
intent in enacting the FTCA to position the United States for 
liability purposes in the position of a private employer. 
It is important to note that section 2674 does not state 
exhaustively those defenses to which the United States is 
entitled; rather, it reserves explicitly the United States’ right to 
assert “any other defenses to which [it] is entitled.”  The “other 
defenses” to which the United States is entitled include not only 
those defenses the United States may invoke independently, but 
also any defenses available to a similarly-placed private 
employer answering for the alleged torts of its employee.  In this 
vein, Congress clarified in the report accompanying the Westfall 
Act that “the specific designation of these immunities does not 
imply that traditional common law defenses are not available. . . 
.  [O]rdinary tort defenses, such as contributory negligence, 
assumption of risk, estoppels, waiver and res judicata, as 
applicable, continue to be available to the United States.”  H.R. 
Rep. No. 100-700, at 4 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5945, 5948; see also id., at 7, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5952 (28 
U.S.C. § 2674 “would authorize the United States to utilize all 
of the defenses to which it is independently entitled.”).  
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Defenses available to a similarly-placed employer may be rooted 
in the common law, or they may be created statutorily, as in the 
case of the immunity conferred on charitable nonprofit entities 
and their volunteers under the NJCIA.  Of course, the actual 
availability, vel non, of these defenses generally will depend on 
the law of the state in which the allegedly wrongful act occurred 
because the applicable state law defines the scope of the United 
States’ liability under the FTCA.  See, e.g., Rodriquez v. United 
States, 823 F.2d 735, 741-44, 745 (3d Cir. 1987) (New Jersey 
law on comparative negligence established extent to which 
recovery by plaintiffs against United States could be limited in 
FTCA case).  
Having determined the scope of the defenses available to 
the United States in an action under the FTCA, we decide now 
whether the NJCIA provides an immunity defense in this case.  
The NJCIA, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-7, confers immunity on 
nonprofit entities organized for a charitable purpose as well as 
on the volunteers of those entities.  The act reads, in pertinent 
part:  
No nonprofit corporation, society or association 
organized exclusively for . . . charitable . . . 
purposes or its . . . volunteers shall . . . be liable to 
respond in damages to any person who shall 
suffer damage from the negligence of any agent 
or servant of such corporation . . . where such 
person is a beneficiary, to whatever degree, of the 
works of such nonprofit corporation . . . . 
N.J. Stat. § 2A:53A-7(a).  A further provision of the NJCIA 
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provides similarly that “no person who provides volunteer 
services or assistance for any nonprofit corporation . . . shall be 
liable in any action for damages as a result of his acts of 
commission or omission arising out of and in the course of his 
rendering the volunteer service or assistance.”  N.J. Stat. § 
2A:53A-7.1(b).11
Lomando concedes that if the volunteer physicians “were 
not deemed federal employees and if they were named 
defendants in a state court action [for the injuries involved in 
this case] they would be immune from liability under [the 
NJCIA].”  Appellant’s br. at 13.
   
12
                                                 
11Although Parker Health is a free clinic, there is no requirement 
in the NJCIA that an entity must be free to be organized for a 
charitable purpose. 
  Nevertheless, Lomando 
contends that “once [the volunteer physicians] are deemed 
federal employees, they should no longer be viewed as 
volunteers.”  Id. at 12.  Lomando bases this argument on the 
theory that “the definition of an employee is directly contrary to 
that of a volunteer,” with the former expecting some form of 
compensation and the latter rendering his or her services without 
such an expectation.  Id.  Lomando asserts, as well, that a 
decision applying the statutory immunity derived from the 
 
12Because Lomando does not dispute that all aspects of the 
NJCIA would have been satisfied here in the absence of the 
deemed employee designation, we do not review the District 
Court’s conclusion that the requirements of the NJCIA were 
satisfied.  Consequently, we treat Parker Health and its 
volunteers as being immune from suit under New Jersey law.    
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NJCIA in this case would contravene the Supremacy Clause of 
the United States Constitution, U.S. Const. art. VI cl. 2, because 
the NJCIA provides an immunity defense that is inconsistent 
with the remedial scheme of recovery in 42 U.S.C. § 233 and the 
FTCA.  Id. at 16.  We find both of these contentions 
unpersuasive.  
Lomando fundamentally misapplies the effect of the 
physicians’ “deemed” employee designation.  Under 42 U.S.C. § 
233(o), a volunteer physician is “deemed to be an employee of 
the Public Health Service” but only “[f]or purposes of [42 
U.S.C. § 233].”  Section 233 does not provide for remuneration 
for employees of the PHS; rather, that section addresses only 
“[c]ivil actions or proceedings against commissioned officers or 
employees” of the PHS, and provides that an action under the 
FTCA is the exclusive basis for such suits.  See 42 U.S.C. § 
233(a).  Accordingly, persons “deemed” to be employees of the 
PHS under 42 U.S.C. § 233(o) are not federal employees 
receiving compensation for their work by the federal 
government to the end that they are no longer rendering their 
services as “volunteers” at a free clinic.  To the contrary, the 
employee designation is a legal construct effective only for the 
purposes of section 233.  In addressing the status of health care 
practitioners at clinics receiving section 254b funding who 
similarly are deemed PHS employees, we have noted that 
“[h]ealth care workers at private clinics, even ones receiving 
some federal aid, are not federal employees in the usual sense.  
After all, they do not perform a traditional government function 
or work in a government building, and they are not on the 
federal payroll.”  Santos, 559 F.3d at 200 (quoting Santos ex rel. 
Beato v. United States, 523 F. Supp. 2d 435, 442 (M.D. Pa. 
 
 26 
2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted).13
Lomando’s contention that the Supremacy Clause 
abrogates the NJCIA in the context of this case likewise fails.  
The Supremacy Clause invalidates state law that “interferes with 
or is contrary to federal law.”  Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666, 
82 S.Ct. 1089, 1092 (1962) (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 
Wheat.) 1, 210, 6 L.Ed. 23 (1824)).  Federal law can supersede 
state law in three ways: (1) express preemption, (2) field 
preemption, and (3) conflict preemption.  Farina v. Nokia Inc., 
625 F.3d 97, 115 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Hillsborough Cnty. v. 
Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713, 105 S.Ct. 2371, 
2375 (1985)).  Lomando bases her Supremacy Clause argument 
on conflict preemption, which “nullifies state law inasmuch as it 
conflicts with federal law, either where compliance with both 
laws is impossible or where state law erects an ‘obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and 
objectives of Congress.’”  Farina, 625 F.3d at 115 (quoting 
Hillsborough Cnty., 471 U.S. at 713, 105 S.Ct. at 2375).  
Lomando urges that under 42 U.S.C. § 233(a) Congress 
intended to provide a means of financial recovery for tort 
victims injured by volunteer physicians and “[r]ecoveries that 
 
                                                 
13This is, of course, to say nothing of the fact that Lomando’s 
position on this point, if accepted, would render null the entirety 
of 42 U.S.C. § 233(o) dealing with volunteers at free clinics.  
Under 42 U.S.C. § 233(o)(2)(D), an individual must not receive 
recompense, i.e., he or she must render “[v]olunteer services,” to 
be deemed an employee of the PHS.  In Lomando’s view, 
however, once deemed an “employee” by virtue of such 
volunteerism, the individual is no longer a “volunteer.”   
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are allowed under [s]ection 233(a) should not be immunized by 
state law,” because that immunization leaves victims without a 
remedy.  Appellant’s br. at 17.   
 It is true that Congress has waived the sovereign 
immunity of the United States for tort actions against volunteer 
physicians “deemed” federal employees under 42 U.S.C. § 
233(o), and thereby has provided that a claim against the United 
States under the FTCA is an injured party’s exclusive remedy in 
such circumstances.  However, 28 U.S.C. § 2674, which permits 
the United States to invoke the defense provided by the NJCIA, 
circumscribes that waiver.  See United States v. Jicarilla Apache 
Nation, __ U.S. __, __, 131 S.Ct. 2313, 2323 (2011) (“The 
Government consents to be liable to private parties ‘and may 
yield this consent upon such terms and under such restrictions as 
it may think just.’” (quoting Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land 
& Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 283 (1856)).  Section 2674 
clearly expresses Congress’ objectives in this regard, and that 
intent is made all the more forceful by the legislative history 
surrounding the enactment of 42 U.S.C. § 233(o).  In addressing 
subsection 233(o), Congress stated:  
The Committee is aware that each of the 
50 states have passed laws to limit the liability of 
volunteers in a variety of circumstances.  This 
provision does not preempt those laws beyond the 
preemption provided in the Federal Tort Claims 
Act.  Instead, the United States shall be liable in 
the same manner and to the same extent as a 
private individual in the same circumstances 
under State law. 
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H.R. Rep. No. 104-736, at 279, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2092 
(emphasis added). 
Application of the NJCIA coupled with the exclusive 
force of the FTCA preclude Lomando from making a recovery 
from the United States predicated on the alleged malpractice of 
the Parker Health volunteer physicians.  Contrary to Lomando’s 
contentions, however, this outcome is not at all inconsistent with 
Congress’ objectives.  See H.R. Rep. No. 100-700, at 6, 1988 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5950 (“The ‘exclusive remedy’ provision of 
[the FTCA] is intended to substitute the United States as the 
solely permissible defendant . . . .  Therefore, suits against 
Federal employees are precluded even where the United States 
has a defense which prevents an actual recovery.”) (emphasis 
added); see also United States v. Smith, 499 U.S. 160, 166, 111 
S.Ct. 1180, 1185 (1991) (“Congress recognized that the required 
substitution of the United States as the defendant in tort suits 
filed against Government employees would sometimes foreclose 
a tort plaintiff’s recovery altogether.”).  Accordingly, in 
upholding the District Court decision applying the NJCIA to bar 
this action against the United States, we are not making a ruling 
in any way contrary to the terms or intent of 42 U.S.C. § 233(o) 
or the FTCA.  Therefore, the Supremacy Clause does not bar the 
result we reach in this case.   
 In summary, we hold that the District Court did not err in 
holding that the United States was immune from this suit.  The 
United States is entitled to the protection of the immunity the 
NJCIA provides because a similarly-placed private employer 
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would be entitled to that defense and the United States’ deemed 
employees in this case, the individual physicians, would be 
entitled to that defense as well.14
(2) Whether the District Court erred in deciding that the 
treatment provided to Laura by Drs. Reynolds and 
Talbert constituted emergency medicine such that N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-41 applies?  If the Court did not so 
err, did one of Lomando’s experts, Dr. Fialk, satisfy N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-41? 
 
To state a prima facie case of medical malpractice in 
New Jersey, ordinarily “a plaintiff must present expert testimony 
establishing (1) the applicable standard of care; (2) a deviation 
from that standard of care; and (3) that the deviation proximately 
caused the injury.”  Gardner v. Pawliw, 696 A.2d 599, 608 (N.J. 
1997) (citations omitted).  As part of an effort at comprehensive 
tort reform and to counter a severe increase in medical 
malpractice liability insurance premiums, in 2004 the New 
Jersey Legislature enacted the New Jersey Medical Care Access 
and Responsibility and Patients First Act (“Access and 
Responsibility Act”), N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2A:53A-37 to -42 (West 
2011).  Among other things, the Access and Responsibility Act 
“provides more detailed standards for a testifying expert . . . , 
generally requiring the challenging expert to be equivalently-
qualified to the defendant.”  Ryan v. Renny, 999 A.2d 427, 436 
                                                 
14Inasmuch as we conclude that the United States is immune 
from suit under the NJCIA, we need not determine whether the 
VPA also may have provided it with an immunity defense.   
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(N.J. 2010).15
The legislature set forth these standards in N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 2A:53A-41, which provides, in relevant part:  
   
 In an action alleging medical malpractice, 
a person shall not give expert testimony . . . on the 
appropriate standard of practice or care unless the 
person is licensed as a physician or other health 
care professional in the United States and meets 
the following criteria: 
 (a) If the party against whom or on 
whose behalf the testimony is offered is a 
specialist or subspecialist recognized by 
the American Board of Medical Specialties 
[‘ABMS’] or the American Osteopathic 
Association [‘AOA’] and the care or 
treatment at issue involves that specialty or 
subspecialty recognized by the [ABMS] or 
[AOA], the person providing the testimony 
shall have specialized at the time of the 
occurrence that is the basis for the action 
in the same specialty or subspecialty, 
recognized by the [ABMS] or the [AOA], 
                                                 
15These standards apply also to an affidavit of merit supporting a 
malpractice claim that a New Jersey statute requires for the 
initiation of a malpractice action, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-27 
(West 2011), but compliance with that statute is not raised as an 
issue in this case.   
 
 31 
as the party against whom or on whose 
behalf the testimony is offered, and if the 
person against whom or on whose behalf 
the testimony is being offered is board 
certified and the care or treatment at issue 
involves that board specialty or 
subspecialty recognized by the [ABMS] or 
the [AOA], the expert witness shall be: 
(1) a physician credentialed by a 
hospital to treat patients for the 
medical condition, or to perform 
the procedure, that is the basis for 
the claim or action; or  
(2) a specialist or subspecialist 
recognized by the [ABMS] or the 
[AOA] who is board certified in the 
same specialty or subspecialty 
recognized by the [ABMS] or the 
[AOA], and during the year 
immediately preceding the date of 
the occurrence that is the basis for 
the claim or action, shall have 
devoted a majority of his 
professional time to either:  
(a) the active clinical 
practice of the same health 
care profession in which the 
defendant is licensed, and if 
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the defendant is a specialist 
or subspecialist recognized 
by the [ABMS] or the 
[AOA], the active clinical 
practice of that subspecialty 
recognized by the [ABMS] 
or the [AOA]; or 
(b) [the instruction of 
students in an accredited 
medical school, accredited 
health professional school, 
accredited residency 
program or research 
program] in the same health 
care profession in which the 
defendant is licensed, and, if 
that party is a specialist or 
subspecialist recognized by 
the [ABMS] or the [AOA] 
[one of the aforementioned 
programs] in the same 
specialty or subspecialty 
recognized by the [ABMS] 
or the [AOA]; or 
(c) both. 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-41(b) also governs the scenario in 
which the defendant health-care provider is a “general 
practitioner.”  Thus, “[t]he statute sets forth three distinct 
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categories embodying this kind-for-kind rule: (1) those who are 
specialists in a field recognized by the [ABMS or AOA] but 
who are not board certified in that specialty; (2) those who are 
specialists in a field recognized by the ABMS [or AOA] and 
who are board certified in that specialty; and (3) those who are 
‘general practitioners.’”  Buck v. Henry, 25 A.3d 240, 247 (N.J. 
2011).   
Drs. Reynolds and Talbert are board-certified specialists 
in emergency medicine, a specialty that the ABMS and the AOA 
recognize.16  Lomando submitted statements by two experts, 
Drs. Fialk and Hayes, neither of whom is a specialist in the field 
of emergency medicine, in the District Court.  Lomando 
contended, however, that N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-41 did not 
apply to her claims against Drs. Reynolds and Talbert because 
they provided care that did not “involve” their specialty of 
emergency medicine.  The Court rejected this argument, finding 
that they rendered care on September 5, 15, and 20 that 
constituted the practice of emergency medicine, as the ABMS 
and American Board of Emergency Medicine (“ABEM”) define 
that field.17
                                                 
16Dr. Reynolds is a doctor of osteopathic medicine; thus, the 
AOA certified her in emergency medicine.     
  Lomando contends that the Court erred in making 
 
17As noted, Laura visited the Riverview Medical Center’s 
Emergency Room Department on September 3, 5, 15, and 20, 
2006.  Ms. Biedenbach evaluated Laura on September 3, see 
appellant’s br. at 5, and because the District Court refused to 
consider the treatment Ms. Biedenbach provided, the Court did 
not include the events of September 3 in its discussion of  N.J. 
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this finding, and argues that the physicians’ treatment of Laura 
on September 5 and 15 “involved [the] general skill and 
knowledge of a physician and did not require the specialized 
training of an emergency department physician.”  Appellant’s 
br. at 9.18
Lomando now raises an additional argument that she did 
not present squarely to the District Court.  Lomando contends 
that because Dr. Fialk “is board certified in oncology and has 
hospital appointments to treat patients with cancer” and because 
“the basis” for Lomando’s claim is the “failure to diagnose 
lymphoma,” Dr. Fialk’s qualifications satisfy N.J. Stat. Ann. § 
2A:53A-41(a)(1).  Appellant’s br. at 18-19.  We address these 
arguments in turn.
   
19
                                                                                                             
Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-41. 
 
 
18Lomando seemingly has abandoned her contention that the 
care rendered on September 20 did not constitute emergency 
medicine.  See appellant’s br. at 9, 23.   
 
19“‘Generally, failure to raise an issue in the District Court 
results in its waiver on appeal.’”  Webb v. City of Philadelphia, 
562 F.3d 256, 263 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Huber v. Taylor, 469 
F.3d 67, 74 (3d Cir. 2006)).  Nonetheless, the waiver rule “is 
one of discretion rather than jurisdiction,” and “it may be 
relaxed whenever the public interest . . . so warrants.”  Barefoot 
Architect, Inc. v. Bunge, 632 F.3d 822, 834-35 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Webb, 
562 F.3d at 263.  When considering whether to address an issue 
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(a) The Care Provided by Drs. Reynolds and Talbert 
Involved Emergency Medicine. 
The ABMS defines the specialty of emergency medicine 
as: 
the immediate decision making and action 
necessary to prevent death or any further 
                                                                                                             
not previously raised, a court considers whether the issue is “a 
pure question of law . . . where refusal to reach the issue would 
result in a miscarriage of justice or where the issue’s resolution 
is of public importance.”  Huber, 469 F.3d at 74-75.  In 
considering a waiver claim, a court takes into account also the 
dual purposes of the doctrine: “ensuring that the necessary 
evidentiary development occurs in the trial court, and preventing 
surprise to the parties when a case is decided on some basis on 
which they have not presented argument.”  Barefoot, 632 F.3d at 
835 (citing Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 556, 61 S.Ct. 
719, 721 (1941)); see also Huber, 469 F.3d at 75.   
 
It would not serve the purposes of the waiver rule to 
apply it in this case.  Evidentiary development is largely 
irrelevant to the question of law at issue here, and appellees 
were on notice from the inception of this case that the 
application of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-41 was at issue, even if 
Lomando did not invoke the specific paragraph we now 
consider.  In this vein, appellees explicitly argued in the District 
Court that Lomando’s experts did not satisfy N.J. Stat. Ann. § 
2A:53A-41(a)(1).  See app. at 300.  
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disability in both the pre-hospital setting by 
directing emergency medical technicians and in 
the emergency department.  This special[ty 
involves] immediate recognition, evaluation, care, 
stabilization and disposition of a generally 
diversified population of adult and pediatric 
patients in response to acute illness and injury.   
Lomando, 2011 WL 1042900, at *12; see also Buck, 25 A.3d at 
249 (referencing the ABMS definition of “emergency 
medicine”).  The ABEM describes the practice of emergency 
medicine as “begin[ning] with the recognition of patterns in the 
patient’s presentation that points to a specific diagnosis or 
diagnoses.  Pattern recognition is both the hallmark and 
cornerstone of the clinical practice of Emergency Medicine, 
guiding the diagnostic tests and therapeutic interventions during 
the entire patient encounter.”  Lomando, 2011 WL 1042900, at 
*12 (emphasis in original deleted).20
On September 5, Laura arrived at Riverview Medical 
  Bearing in mind these 
definitions of emergency medicine, we agree with the District 
Court that Drs. Reynolds and Talbert provided Laura with care 
involving the practice of emergency medicine.   
                                                 
20The ABEM is “one of 24 medical specialty certification boards 
recognized by the [ABMS]” and is the entity actually 
responsible for certifying physicians in emergency medicine.  
http://www.abem.org/PUBLIC/portal/alias__Rainbow/lang__en
-US/tabID__3333/DesktopDefault.aspx.  Because we are not 
aware of an AOA definition of emergency medicine, we 
reference only the ABMS and ABEM definition.   
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Center’s Emergency Department complaining of the acute 
symptoms of chest pain and tightness, nausea, diarrhea, and 
shortness of breath.  In response, Dr. Reynolds examined Laura, 
ordered that she be given medication intravenously for her chest 
tightness, and instructed her to stop taking certain medication, 
the consumption of which coincided with the advent of Laura’s 
chest tightness, nausea, and diarrhea.  During the examination, 
Dr. Reynolds became aware that Laura’s left lymph node was 
swollen.  Once Laura’s nausea and chest pain improved, she was 
discharged from the hospital with a working diagnosis of 
reaction to medication, muscle strain, and a swollen salivary 
duct.  In line with the ABMS definition of emergency medicine, 
Laura’s symptoms on this visit were largely acute, and Dr. 
Reynolds engaged in the task of “evaluation” and “stabilization” 
of Laura in response to those symptoms.   
On September 15, Laura presented to Riverview’s 
Emergency Department with a history of Epstein-Barr 
Syndrome, a fever, and showing signs of dehydration.  Laura’s 
incoming patient report notified Riverview that she was 
suspicious for meningitis, had neck pain, and an enlarged lymph 
node on the left side of her neck.  Upon examination, Dr. 
Talbert observed that Laura had left anterior adenopathy.  Dr. 
Talbert ordered that fluids and medication be given to Laura to 
treat her dehydration and fever, and ordered that she be given a 
mononucleosis test.  Once Laura’s fever decreased and she was 
in stable condition, she was discharged from the hospital.  
Again, consistently with the ABMS definition of emergency 
medicine, Dr. Talbert engaged in the “immediate decision 
making and action necessary” to care for and ultimately 
“stabiliz[e]” Laura.  Further, based on Laura’s pattern of 
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symptoms at that visit, Dr. Talbert ordered the diagnostic test for 
mononucleosis.   
 Though we do not hold that treatment provided in an 
emergency room necessarily involves the practice of emergency 
medicine, the care that Drs. Reynolds and Talbert provided was 
emergency medicine and falls within the practice of emergency 
care as the applicable certifying bodies define that field.  
Accordingly, the District Court correctly concluded that N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-41(a) applied.   
(b) Dr. Fialk’s qualifications do not satisfy N.J. Stat. 
Ann. § 2A:53A-41(a)(1). 
We turn now to Lomando’s contention, that even if N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-41(a) applies, Dr. Fialk’s qualifications 
meet the requirements of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-41(a)(1).  As 
stated, Drs. Reynolds and Talbert are board-certified specialists 
in emergency medicine; thus, Lomando was required to provide 
testimony prepared by experts who met the requirements 
imposed on experts who testify against board-certified 
specialists.  There is a question, however, as to what those 
requirements may be.  In Lomando’s view, an expert offering 
testimony against a board-certified specialist need not share that 
specialty, but rather the expert only must satisfy the hospital 
appointment mandate of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-41(a)(1) or 
the board certification plus clinical or instructional experience 
requirements of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-41(a)(2).  In this 
regard, Lomando contends that because Dr. Fialk has “hospital 
appointments to treat patients with cancer,” appellant’s br. at 18, 
his qualifications satisfy the mandates of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 
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2A:53A-41(a)(1).   
The Supreme Court of New Jersey has observed that N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-41 is “far from a model of clarity.”  Buck, 
25 A.3d at 247.  In Ryan, however, that court had provided its 
interpretation of the statute, describing it thusly: 
[W]here the defendant is a specialist or 
subspecialist, the person providing the testimony 
against him ‘shall have specialized at the time of 
the occurrence that is the basis for the action in 
the same specialty or subspecialty[.]’  N.J. Stat. 
Ann. § 2A:53A-41(a).  Further, where the 
defendant is board certified, the witness against 
him must also be board certified in the same 
specialty or subspecialty, [Here, the Court 
inserted the following footnote: ‘Alternatively, 
the witness shall be “a physician credentialed by a 
hospital” to treat the condition or perform the 
procedure that is the basis of the claim.  N.J. Stat. 
Ann. § 2A:53A-41(a)(1).’], and ‘during the year 
immediately preceding the date of the occurrence 
that is the basis of the claim or action, shall have 
devoted a majority of his professional time to’ 
active clinical practice or teaching of the specialty 
or subspecialty.  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-
41(a)(2).   
999 A.2d at 440 (original emphasis omitted and current 
emphasis added); see also Buck, 25 A.3d at 247 (labeling the 
requirements imposed by N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-41(a)(1) and 
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-41(a)(2) as “additional qualifications” an expert witness must 
meet beyond those delineated in N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-
41(a)); New Jersey State Bar Ass’n v. State, 902 A.2d 944, 952-
53 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006) (adopting the same 
formulation for N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-41).  Thus, the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey has construed N.J. Stat. Ann. § 
2A:53A-41(a) to require that an expert offering testimony 
against a board-certified specialist share that specialty and meet 
the requirements of either N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-41(a)(1) or -
41(a)(2).  In this way, the court made clear that the hospital 
credential provision of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-41(a)(1) is an 
alternative to the board certification plus teaching or clinical 
practice requirements of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-41(a)(2), but 
it is not an alternative to the specialization requirement of N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-41(a).   
Accordingly, Dr. Fialk may not offer testimony against 
Dr. Reynolds or Dr. Talbert regarding the care provided by those 
physicians to Laura because he is not a specialist in the field of 
emergency medicine.   
 (3) Whether the District Court erred in refusing to 
consider the treatment Ms. Biedenbach rendered for 
purposes of Lomando’s claim against Ms. Biedenbach’s 
employer, Emergency Physician Associates? If the Court 
so erred, does N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-41 apply to 
testimony concerning Ms. Biedenbach? 
(a) Lomando was not required to name Ms. Biedenbach 
as a defendant. 
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 The District Court stated that it would “not consider the 
treatment provided by Ms. Biedenbach in connection with” 
Emergency Physician Associates’ summary judgment motion 
solely because Lomando “ha[d] not named [Ms. Biedenbach] as 
a defendant.”  Lomando, 2011 WL 1042900, at *10 n.10.  
Lomando contends that the Court’s refusal to consider treatment 
that Ms. Biedenbach provided in support of Lomando’s claim 
against her employer, Emergency Physician Associates, was 
legal error, and we agree.  
 New Jersey courts apply the common law principle of 
respondeat superior liability, and thus in that state “an employer 
can be found liable for the negligence of an employee causing 
injuries to third parties, if, at the time of the occurrence, the 
employee was acting within the scope of his or her 
employment.”  Carter v. Reynolds, 815 A.2d 460, 463 (N.J. 
2003) (citing Lehmann v. Toys ‘R’ Us, Inc., 626 A.2d 445, 461-
62 (N.J. 1993)).  New Jersey law, however, does not include a 
requirement that a litigant include the allegedly negligent 
employee as a defendant in an action seeking to impose 
respondeat superior liability on an employer.  See Zukowitz v. 
Halperin, 821 A.2d 527, 530 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) 
(“The judge erred in dismissing plaintiff’s common law claim 
based upon vicarious liability for the negligence of defendant’s 
employees.  See, e.g., Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. 
Corp., [563 A.2d 31, 47-48 (N.J. 1989)].  Whether the 
[employees] were named as defendants is legally irrelevant to 
defendant’s liability for their conduct under the doctrine of 
respondeat superior.  See McFadden v. Turner, [388 A.2d 244 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978)].”); Marion v. Borough of 
Manasquan, 555 A.2d 699, 702 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989) 
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(“In cases not involving the [Tort Claims Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 
59:2-2 (West 2011)]21 in which a plaintiff seeks recovery on the 
theory of respondeat superior, there is no requirement that the 
plaintiff join as a defendant the individual upon whose act or 
failure to act vicarious liability is predicated.  Indeed, the 
plaintiff has the option to sue the party vicariously liable for the 
conduct of an agent in one law suit and thereafter, pursue the 
agent in a separate suit.  In such cases, the concept of mandatory 
joinder does not apply.” (citing McFadden, 388 A.2d 245-46)); 
Moss v. Jones, 225 A.2d 369, 372 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1966) (“We conclude that a person injured by the negligence of 
an agent or servant may sue the agent or servant and the 
principal or master in one suit, or may proceed against them in 
separate suits . . . .”); see also Great Northern Ins. Co. v. 
Leontarakis, 904 A.2d 846, 853 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006) 
(“The rationale of the rule — ‘that plaintiff is entitled to pursue 
all those who are independently liable to him for his harm until 
one full satisfaction is obtained’ — is equally applicable 
whether the liability is actual or vicarious.” (quoting McFadden, 
388 A.2d at 247)).22
                                                 
21 The Tort Claims Act deals with claims against public entities 
and employees and is not applicable here. 
  Furthermore, “[i]t is well-established that 
 
22In Cogdell v. Hospital Center at Orange, 560 A.2d 1169, 1178 
(N.J. 1989), the New Jersey Supreme Court adopted a 
mandatory joinder rule requiring that “to the extent possible” 
New Jersey courts “determine an entire controversy in a single 
judicial proceeding[,]” that determination “necessarily 
embrac[ing] not only joinder of single related claims between 
the parties but also joinder of all persons who have a material 
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[Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 19 does not require the joinder 
of joint tortfeasors[;] [n]or does it require joinder of principal 
and agent.”  Nottingham v. Gen. Am. Commc’ns Corp., 811 
F.2d 873, 880 (5th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (citations omitted); 
see also Temple v. Synthes Corp., Ltd., 498 U.S. 5, 7, 111 S.Ct. 
315, 316 (1990) (“It has long been the rule that it is not 
necessary for all joint tortfeasors to be named as defendants in a 
single lawsuit.”). 
Accordingly, we hold that the District Court erred when it 
excluded from consideration the care that Ms. Biedenbach 
provided in assessing Lomando’s claim against Emergency 
Physician Associates.  The Court was not precluded from taking 
into account Ms. Biedenbach’s care in considering Lomando’s 
claim against her employer notwithstanding Ms. Biedenbach’s 
non-party status.   
(b) N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-41 does not apply to 
physician assistants. 
We now reach the final issue in this appeal, which also 
relates to Ms. Biedenbach: whether N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-41 
applies to expert testimony offered to evaluate the care she 
                                                                                                             
interest in the controversy.”  That rule proved to be highly 
controversial and has been replaced by a mechanism of 
disclosure whereby “a party to any litigation is obligated to 
reveal the existence of any non-party who should be joined or 
who might have ‘potential liability to any party on the basis of 
the same transactional facts.’”  Kent Motor Cars, Inc. v. 
Reynolds and Reynolds, Co., 25 A.3d 1027, 1037 (N.J. 2011).  
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provided.  Lomando contends that N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-41 
does not apply to non-physicians, while appellee Emergency 
Physician Associates asserts that the statute encompasses 
physician assistants.  Because the question of whether N.J. Stat. 
Ann. § 2A:53A-41 applies to Ms. Biedenbach is a potentially 
dispositive legal question in this case, we will address the 
matter.  
To the best of our knowledge, the New Jersey Supreme 
Court has yet to confront explicitly the question of whether N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-41 applies only to physicians, or whether 
its scope is broader.23
                                                 
23Notably in Buck the New Jersey Supreme Court appeared to 
assume that the statute applied only to physicians.  25 A.3d at 
247 (“The basic principle behind [N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-41] 
is that the challenging expert who executes an affidavit of merit 
in a medical malpractice case, generally, should be equivalently-
qualified to the defendant physician.”) (emphasis added) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); id. at 248 
(“Under [N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-41(a)], the first inquiry must 
be whether a physician is a specialist or general practitioner.  If 
the physician is a specialist, then the second inquiry must be 
whether the treatment that is the basis of the malpractice action 
‘involves’ the physician’s specialty.”) (emphasis added).  But 
we cannot regard Buck as conclusive on the point, as the court’s 
use of the word “physician” merely might reflect the identity of 
the parties in that case. 
  “In the absence of a controlling decision 
by the [New Jersey] Supreme Court, we must predict how it 
would rule if faced with the issue.”  See Spence v. ESAB Grp., 
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Inc., 623 F.3d 212, 216 (3d Cir. 2010).  In making this 
prediction, we look to “‘decisions of state intermediate appellate 
courts, of federal courts interpreting that state’s law, and of 
other state supreme courts that have addressed the issue,’” as 
well as to “‘analogous decisions, considered dicta, scholarly 
works, and any other reliable data tending convincingly to show 
how the highest court in the state would decide the issue at 
hand.’”  Id. at 216-17 (quoting Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Basell 
USA Inc., 512 F.3d 86, 92 (3d Cir. 2008)).  
Of course, in interpreting a statute, we first examine its 
text as the Supreme Court of New Jersey would do in any case 
of statutory interpretation.24
                                                 
24We are not aware of any precedential opinions by the New 
Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, on whether N.J. Stat. 
Ann. § 2A:33A-41 applies to a physician assistant.  In 
conformity with the practice of this Court, we will not refer to 
the Appellate Division’s not precedential opinions dealing with 
the issue.   
  DiProspero v. Penn, 874 A.2d 
1039, 1049 (N.J. 2005) (“Our analysis . . . begins with the plain 
language of the statute.”) (citing Miah v. Ahmed, 846 A.2d 
1244, 1249 (N.J. 2004)).  “If the language is plain and clearly 
reveals the statute’s meaning, the Court’s sole function is to 
enforce the statute according to its terms.”  Frugis v. 
Bracligliano, 827 A.2d 1040, 1058 (N.J. 2003).  “If the statute 
suggests more than one interpretation, the broader legislative 
scheme, its history, and relevant sponsor statements may also 
inform the Court’s interpretation in light of the statute’s overall 
policy and purpose.”  Id.  In interpreting a statute, the New 
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Jersey courts’ “overriding goal must be to determine the 
Legislature’s intent.”  Frugis, 827 A.2d at 1058 (quoting 
Cornblatt, P.A. v. Barow, 708 A.2d 401, 407 (N.J. 1998)); see 
also DiProspero, 874 A.2d at 1048 (“The Legislature’s intent is 
the paramount goal when interpreting a statute.”).   
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-41(a) applies to Ms. 
Biedenbach only if she is “a specialist or subspecialist 
recognized by the [ABMS] or the [AOA] and the care or 
treatment at issue involves that specialty or subspecialty 
recognized by the [ABMS] or [AOA].”  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 
2A:53A-41.25
http://abms.org/who_we_help/physicians/specialties.aspx
  The ABMS is made up of Member Boards, 
including the ABEM, which are responsible for “certify[ing] 
physicians.”  
.  
Similarly, the AOA oversees Specialty Certifying Boards, which 
certify doctors of osteopathic medicine.  
http://www.osteopathic.org/inside-aoa/development/aoa-board-
certification/Pages/default.aspx.  Thus, it would seem that N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-41(a) applies only to persons offering 
testimony against specialized or licensed physicians.  In this 
vein, we reject Emergency Physician Associates’ argument that 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-41(a) applies because Ms. Biedenbach 
practices in emergency rooms and because “Ms. Biedenbach’s 
care and treatment of [Laura] involved the ABMS recognized 
                                                 
25Emergency Physician Associates does not contend that Ms. 
Biedenbach qualifies as a board-certified specialist in 
emergency medicine.     
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specialty of Emergency Medicine.”  Appellee’s br. at 22.26
Concededly, N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2A:53A-41 includes some 
text in tension with our reading of the statute.  Paragraph 
41(a)(2)(a) provides that an expert must be engaged in “the 
active clinical practice of the same health care profession in 
which the defendant is licensed,” and paragraph 41(a)(2)(b) 
provides similarly that the expert must have participated in the 
“instruction of students . . . in the same health care profession in 
which the defendant is licensed.”  (emphasis added).  This 
language, of course, gives rise to the inference that the statute 
encompasses more than one type of health care profession.  
Nevertheless, these provisions apply only in the circumstance 
that the defendant is board-certified in a specialty that the 
ABMS or AOA recognizes, and as explained above, those 
  It 
may be that Ms. Biedenbach practices emergency care as the 
general public understands that term, and it may be that the care 
she provided to Laura involved that practice; however, it cannot 
be said that Ms. Biedenbach is a specialist in emergency 
medicine as the ABMS or AOA define that field or that the 
treatment she rendered to Laura involved that recognized 
specialty because those entities define and recognize specialties 
applicable only to physicians. 
                                                 
26Emergency Physician Associates appears to argue as well that 
because the training required to become a physician assistant is 
“almost the same at that obtained by physicians,” appellee’s br. 
at 21, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-41(a) applies.  The level of 
training required to become a physician assistant is entirely 
irrelevant to whether those professionals are encompassed by 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-41(a).   
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entities recognize specialties only for physicians.27
 Considering the text of the statute as a whole, we 
conclude that N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-41(a) applies only to 
physicians.  We note that this conclusion is in line with the New 
Jersey Legislature’s purpose in enacting the Access and 
Responsibility Act.  In New Jersey State Bar Ass’n v. State, 888 
A.2d 526, 535 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2005), the Superior 
Court extensively recounted the legislative history of the Access 
and Responsibility Act, and described the purpose thusly: “The 
overarching concern that came out of the hearings [on the Act] 
and the problem the bill aimed to solve (as noted in the 
legislative purpose) . . . [was that] ‘as a consequence of the cost 
of medical malpractice insurance, many physicians feel they 
cannot afford to practice medicine, and, therefore the medical 
services needed will not be available to [New Jersey’s] 
citizens.’”  (quoting August 2002 Hearing (comments of 
 
                                                 
27The ambiguous drafting of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-41 
renders strict reliance on the text problematic.  For example, 
paragraphs 41(a)(2)(a) and 41(a)(2)(b) also include language 
that reads “if the defendant is a specialist or subspecialist 
recognized by the [ABMS] or the [AOA]” the clinical practice 
or pedagogical experience must be in that recognized specialty 
or subspecialty.  Again, paragraphs 41(a)(2)(a) and 41(a)(2)(b) 
apply only where the defendant is a board-certified specialist in 
a recognized specialty.  A board-certified specialist is, 
obviously, a specialist recognized by the ABMS or AOA.  
Accordingly, the purpose of the “if” language of paragraphs 
41(a)(2)(a) and 41(a)(2)(b) is not clear. 
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Assemblyman Edwards)) (emphasis added).  In this regard, the 
legislature sought to remedy the situation that the physicians 
being forced out were often specialists in obstetrics and 
gynecology, emergency medicine, and surgery, and that 
“physicians in other specialties report[ed] high double-digit 
premium increases and fewer companies willing to write 
coverage.”  888 A.2d at 535 (emphasis added) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted); id. at 536 (“Of particular 
concern was the number of doctors, particularly 
obstetrician/gynecologists, who discontinued parts of their 
practice or retired altogether due to the inability to afford their 
liability coverage.”) (emphasis added).  Accordingly, “[t]he 
goals of the final legislation were to ‘reform the State’s ailing 
medical malpractice insurance system to provide insurance relief 
for doctors and ensure that patients in New Jersey’ will be able 
to get the treatment they seek.”  Id. at 536 (quoting Press 
Release from offices of Senators Vitale and Lesniak (Mar. 22, 
2004)). 
 As a physician assistant, Ms. Biedenbach thus is excluded 
from the criteria for testimony that N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-
41(a) specifies.  We express no opinion as to whether the expert 
statements that Lomando submitted are otherwise sufficient for 
the case against Emergency Physician Associates to proceed, 
and we remand the matter to the District Court so that it may 
determine the course of the case against that defendant.28
                                                 
28Of course we do not express an opinion on whether the District 
Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 
the case against Emergency Physician Associates.  Assuming 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of 
March 18, 2011, in part, will reverse it in part, and will remand 
the case to the District Court for further proceedings but only 
against Emergency Physician Associates as we are affirming the 
summary judgments in favor of all other appellees.  Costs are 
allowed on this appeal in favor of all appellees other than 
Emergency Physician Associates against Lomando and in favor 
of Lomando against Emergency Physician Associates. 
 
                                                                                                             
that it retains the case, the question for the Court will remain 
whether the standards applicable to experts offering testimony 
against a “general practitioner,” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-41(b), 
apply to Ms. Biedenbach.  So far as we are aware, the New 
Jersey courts have not addressed this question with respect to a 
physician assistant.  We note, however, that N.J. Stat. Ann. § 
2A:53A-41(b) does not reference the ABMS or AOA, and 
provides simply that if the defendant “is a general practitioner,” 
the expert, during the year preceding the date of the alleged 
negligence, must have devoted a majority of his professional 
time to “active clinical practice as a general practitioner” or 
active clinical practice encompassing the condition or procedure 
that is the basis for the claim, or the instruction of students in a 
school, residency, or research program “in the same health care 
profession” as the defendant.  We do not offer our opinion on 
this point, which the parties have not addressed in their briefs. 
